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ABSTRACT
A new focus, both domestically and internationally, has been placed on the governance of orbital space traffic. Most
often referred to as "Space Traffic Management", concern focuses on an increased risk of orbital collisions that can
damage operational spacecraft, create interfering orbital debris, and present potential human spaceflight hazards.
Small satellites are especially a focus of concern, as potential populations are increasing by orders of magnitude. There
are a variety of technical and policy based approaches to address this issue. This paper will provide an evaluation of
the risk presented by small satellites and various technical and managerial mitigation steps that can be applied to
address the "problem". In conclusion, we provide an initial "bottoms-up" approach using a Self-Regulatory
Organization model that the small satellite community can embrace to best address space traffic safety concerns, while
enabling commerce and innovation.
.
congestion of the orbital environment and improve space
INTRODUCTION
situational awareness.” This study, part of a much larger
A new focus, both domestically and internationally, has
STM and spaceflight safety assessment was conducted
been placed on the governance of orbital space traffic.
by SAIC (under NASA contract) and presented to
Most often referred to as "Space Traffic Management"
Congress in December of 20162.
(STM), concern focuses on an increased risk of orbital
collisions that can damage operational spacecraft, create
The 2015 CSLCA is but one example of increasing
interfering orbital debris, and present potential human
awareness and concern of spaceflight safety issues
spaceflight hazards. For instance, passed into law in
specifically focused on smallsats. As noted in the SAIC
November of 2015, Section 109 of the “U.S. Commercial
report, the perception of increased space traffic safety
Space Launch Competitiveness Act [CSLCA]” stated,
risk due to smallsats is a combination of the following
factors:
“It is the sense of the Congress that an improved
framework may be necessary for space traffic
 Increasing populations
management of United States Government (USG) assets
 Limited maneuverability
and United States private sector assets in outer space
 Limited operational lifetimes and suspect
and orbital debris mitigation.”1
reliability
 Limited operator experience
The law directed assessments of relevant policy,
 Space Situational Awareness challenges with
regulations, international considerations, technology, and
tracking
operations topics related to STM. Specific focus was
 Operational and decay orbits in high value
placed on smallsat safety issues, directing “[a]n
orbital regions (especially LEO), to include
assessment of the risk to space traffic management
human spaceflight zones
associated with smallsats and any necessary Government
coordination for their launch and utilization to avoid
Brown
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Smallsat spaceflight safety concerns and the associated
risk of increased orbital debris generation, damage to
operational spacecraft, and loss of human life, must be
addressed and taken seriously by the smallsat
community. This paper aims to provide enhanced
awareness, insight, and courses of action which can be
taken by the community of small satellite developers and
operators to appropriately and responsibly address space
traffic safety. The approach we utilize here is

Space Traffic Safety
Space Traffic Safety is freedom from those conditions in
orbital space that may lead to incidents resulting in harm
(death or injury to astronauts and spaceflight participants,
damage to public welfare, damage or loss of spacecraft,
interference to spacecraft). Incidents of specific concern
are collisions or orbital breakups.2
Orbital Zones

1.

Quantify the spaceflight risk of small
satellites, particularly in LEO
2. Examine technical approaches to mitigate
the spaceflight safety risk
3. Examine policy approaches to mitigation of
spaceflight safety risk
4. Provide recommendations for the technical
and policy approaches best suited for the
smallsat community

Orbital Zones are orbits that are subclasses of the typical
orbit types (LEO, MEO, GEO, etc.). Zones can be
delineated by their mission utility to one or more
spacecraft and hence overall value. Examples of specific
orbits that could be designated as orbital zones include
the International Space Station (ISS) orbit, a variety of
sun-synchronous orbits (e.g. the NASA A-Train orbit)
and the Global Positioning System (GPS) orbits.2

DEFINITIONS

SMALLSAT SAFETY RISK ANALYSIS

For purpose of clarity, several key terms and expressions
are defined here:

Prior to providing recommendations for reducing the
spaceflight safety risk of smallsats, that risk must first be
quantified. Furthermore, risk mitigation schemes, or
“levers” must be analyzed for their potential mitigation
impact. These steps should be conducted continuously in
any spaceflight safety governance approach selected to
provide objectivity and effectivity. We begin this
process here, with some initial modelling of a variety of
future LEO orbit contexts involving smallsats.
Specifically, using Aerospace Corporation tools, we
provide modelling results for future CubeSat and large
LEO smallsat constellations and provide metrics of
future collision risk in the LEO environment. Levers of
risk control (e.g. reduced orbital lifetimes, maneuver,
improved SSA, and active debris removal) are analyzed
and addressed for effectiveness.

Smallsat
This paper focuses on developing a smallsat community
of interest with similar goals, objectives, and limitations.
Therefore, strict definitions of “smallsats” based on size
and mass are hard to apply (although CubeSats certainly
will fall into the domain of a proposed community). Of
specific note, large LEO constellations will utilize
smallsats, and those smallsats will present additional
risks to space traffic safety. This paper will quantify this
risk, but only to provide relative context to the more
general hazard presented by CubeSats. The group of
large LEO owner operators is small. Their operational
and financial challenges are similar to each other yet
distinct from the rest of the small satellite community.
Technical and policy risk mitigation schemes and
approaches that address large LEO constellations will
therefore not be considered in this paper (although of
course, many recommendations should be considered to
provide relevant information for large LEO
owner/operator consumption).

Aerospace Corp ADEPT MODEL
The Aerospace Debris Environment Projection Tool
(ADEPT) simulation process generates predictions of the
future orbital population3,4,5 that can be used to evaluate
the long-term implications of technical and policy
proposals. The model includes orbit trajectories, sizes
and masses for a complete set of discrete Earth orbital
objects. The following populations are included: initial
population model (IPM) down to 1 cm in size, a future
launch model (FLM), and debris from future collisions
between the above objects (100 Monte Carlo scenarios).
The IPM itself consists of several sub-populations: the
unclassified U.S. STRATCOM catalog of resident space
objects; currently existing Iridium, Globalstar,
ORBCOMM constellations (which are assumed to be
continuing their operations into the future in the FLM); a

Orbital Debris
Orbital Debris is any object placed in space by humans
that remains in orbit and no longer serves any useful
function. Objects range from spacecraft to spent launch
vehicle stages to components and also include materials,
trash, refuse, fragments, and other objects that are overtly
or inadvertently cast off or generated.2
Brown
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value. For purposes of this analysis, all CubeSats were
assumed to be of the 3U configuration with random
variations in the area-to-mass ratio to reflect realistic
configurations.

sub-trackable population based on a statistical
assessment of debris generated from historical sources;
an “unknown” statistical population to bring the total
count of trackable objects to the publicly stated value of
24000; and a sub-trackable population based on explicit
modeling of the Fengyun-1C and Iridium 33/Cosmos
2251 collisions. The IPM is augmented with the future
launch model (FLM) which is based on replicating the
last 10 years of historical behavior for launched objects
remaining in near-Earth space (i.e., LEO to GEO). Once
the IPM and FLM have been generated, all objects are
propagated from initial epoch to 200 years into the future
using the mean element propagation code MEANPROP6
with operational satellites having appropriate
perturbations turned off to simulated station-keeping.
The 200-year timeframe is selected for two related
reasons: 1) a long-time scale is necessary to appropriately
understand the factors that drive long-term debris growth,
and 2) policy makers are concerned with such time scales
when developing policy documents such as the United
States Orbital Debris Mitigation Standard Practices
(ODMSP). Collisions are determined through an orbit
trace crossing method (OTC) over 100 Monte Carlo
samplings with debris down to 1 cm being generated for
identified collisions and explosions using the
hypervelocity code IMPACT7,8.

The CubeSat simulation model assumes 749, 385, and
588 CubeSats would be deployed for LEO-compliant,
LEO-non-compliant, and GTO-non-compliant groups
per year, respectively with a total average of 1722 per
year, which is roughly equivalent to each upper stage that
achieves orbit depositing ~20 CubeSats into the
environment. This represents a significant increase over
current levels, but given the rate of growth of CubeSat
activity and the large deployments expected in the near
future, this is not an unreasonably high rate over the long
term. To place the 1722 per year number into context, the
Fengyun 1C event has produced 3425 tracked debris
objects, while Iridium/Cosmos collision produced 2294.
Two sample large constellations of small satellites were
also included in the simulation. They will be referred to
as the Future Constellation Model (FCM) and consist of
a 4080 satellite constellation at 1100 km altitude and 87
degree inclination (FCM 1), and a 720 satellite
constellation at 1200 km altitude and 88 degree
inclination (FCM 2). FCM 1 had 48 separate orbit planes
with 85 50-kg satellites each while FCM 2 had 18 planes
with 40 150-kg satellites each. A launch model was
assumed where satellites from a given launch were all
placed into the same plane with launches evenly
distributed throughout each constellation’s lifetime. Each
satellite was assumed to have a 6-year mission lifetime,
but were consistently replenished throughout the run
duration. This implies that 800 FCM (680 FCM 1 and
120 FCM 2) satellites were placed into orbit each year.

End-of-life disposal for FLM objects is based upon a
“Business-as-Usual” (BAU) model where all worldwide
future launched objects move to disposal orbits at end of
life near their mission orbits and do nothing else to
comply with any international disposal guidelines. The
only change to the satellite or rocket body mission orbit
at end of life is to increase or decrease mean altitude by
50 km to clear the operational altitude. The label “BAU”
will be used hereafter to refer to the IPM and FLM
models together with the FLM undergoing the BAU
disposal profile.

The operational FCM satellites were constrained to the
stated altitude and were propagated without drag to
simulate altitude station-keeping in a manner similar to
the operational FLM satellites. For disposal, satellites
were placed onto orbits that would result in a 5-year timeto-decay. This represents a “good steward” approach to
orbit lifetime that is more aggressive than the current
ODMSP 25-year rule, but is consistent with public
statements made by those considering such large
constellations. In addition, a 10% failure rate was
assumed for the FCM. These failures occurred either in
ascent (4%) where ascent was also assumed to be low
thrust from upper stage deployment to operational
altitude, during operations (2%), or during disposal (4%).
Failed satellites drifted as normal orbit perturbations
(including drag if appropriate) required.

CubeSats were modeled as being deployed from upper
stages that were already in the FLM (simulating rideshare arrangements). They were segmented into 3
groups: those satisfying the 25-year decay requirement,
those that were deployed to higher LEO such that they
would not decay after 25 years, and those that were
deployed from upper stages involving missions to higher
altitude orbits (i.e., missions to MEO, HEO, and GEO;
these CubeSats would not be expected to comply with the
25-year requirement as a matter of design although
sometimes natural perturbations could combine to make
re-entry within 25 years occur). These groups are
hereafter referred to as LEO-compliant, LEO-noncompliant, and GTO-non-compliant respectively. The
boundary line between the LEO-compliant and LEOnon-compliant altitudes is roughly 550-600 km for a 3U
CubeSat, but individual configurations will vary in that
Brown

The CubeSat and FCM populations were added into the
general ADEPT processing and treated in a manner
similar to the IPM and FLM when generating collisions
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and debris, but book-kept separately to examine trends.
The CubeSats represent a distributed smallsat population
while the two FCMs represent large formal constellations
of smallsats.
Simulation Results
Figure 1 shows the spatial density of >1 cm objects
(including generated collision debris) at 100 years from
the simulation as a function of altitude for the various
scenarios: the label “Current” is for the density at the
current time (i.e., 0 years to provide a baseline for
comparison), “BAU only” stands for Business-as-Usual
(no large constellations or additional CubeSats),
“FCM+BAU” is the density when the large constellations
are included with BAU, “Cube+BAU” denotes the
density when CubeSats are included with the BAU
model, and “Total” is for BAU, FCM, and CubeSats
together. Note that these curves were generated as an
average over 100 Monte Carlo runs; individual runs
showed high variability.

Figure 1: Spatial density projections at 100 years
in LEO for >1 cm objects
Figure 2 shows the number of collisions between objects
larger than 10 cm found from the ADEPT model for each
of the examined scenarios. In total, the BAU model
produced 21684 collisions over 200 years for all 100
Monte Carlo cases (a mean of 1.1 collisions per year)
while the modelled CubeSat population caused an
additional 34223 collisions (a mean of 1.7 collisions per
year) and the FCM population 18787 (a mean of 0.94
collisions per year). As a side note, most of the FCM
collisions are occurring for satellites that failed on-orbit
and did not dispose; the shown curve thus strongly
depends on the rate at which FCM satellites fail to
dispose. While the modelled CubeSats are experiencing
more collisions than BAU or FCM, they are smaller in
size and hence each collision tends to produce less debris,
resulting in the comparable increases in density observed
in Figure 1.

The first thing to note is that the debris environment is
going to increase noticeably in next 100 years even if
there are no large constellations or high levels of CubeSat
activity; in this case, the overall integrated spatial density
in LEO will increase by roughly an order of magnitude,
and either the FCM or CubeSat model will double that
again. These values are of course dependent upon the
specific models assumed here but in general the debris
environment could increase substantially based on future
CubeSat and FCM activity over what is otherwise
expected.
Another issue to notice is the spike that occurs at ~14001500 km. This is caused by the Globalstar and Strela
constellations. Under the FLM, the Globalstar
constellation is assumed to be continuously replenished
and, at end-of-life, disposed to higher altitudes. However,
the Soviet-era Strela-1 and Strela-3 data dump
constellations are in this higher altitude regime as well.
They are older and no longer operational with the last
launch occurring in 2004, but there are over 500 of them.
The Russians are now launching several Strela-3M
satellites every year into this altitude region as well. The
Strelas are all under 300 kg and so can be considered
small satellites, and their placement into a non-drag orbit
altitude could cause a substantial growth in debris in the
future. This is an important point: if disposal is not
properly performed, then smallsats will become a
significant contributor to the debris environment.

Brown

When examining the CubeSat model in greater detail, the
LEO-compliant group experienced 1855 collisions,
31245 for the LEO-non-compliant group, and 1123 for
GTO-non-compliant. So even though the LEO-noncompliant group was placing less than a quarter of the
number of CubeSats into orbit relative to the other two
groups (385 out of the total 1722 per year), it generated
far more collisions. These results imply that CubeSats, if
launched to LEO but compliant with the 25-year rule,
will not participate in many collisions while CubeSats
launched on GTOs similarly will not experience many
events. However, CubeSats in LEO, but high enough in
altitude to not comply with a 25-year decay will
accumulate over time and produce an increasing number
of collisions. In summary, for the CubeSat model used
here, adherence to the 25-year ODMSP rule would
reduce the number of CubeSat collisions by over 90%.
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Figure 3: Historical number of re-entering objects
Figure 2: Number of collisions per year for BAUonly, FCM, and CubeSat Groups averaged over
100 Monte Carlos

TECHNICAL MITIGATION SCHEMES

One issue that needs to be taken into consideration with
adherence to guidelines is that if disposal by re-entry is
performed for the CubeSats and FCM satellites, then they
are going to come down through the altitude region
where ISS and Tiangong-2 (and potentially other future
manned spacecraft) currently reside (350-450 km).
Figure 3 shows the historical number of re-entries from
the public catalog since the year 2000. Most of these are
debris with satellites and spent upper stages making up a
small fraction of the overall total. Currently, ISS
performs on average approximately two debris avoidance
maneuvers (DAMs) per year to avoid these re-entering
objects.

Mitigation of the debris problem is synonymous with
reducing the number of collisions. Debris that does not
have a risk of collision poses no possibility of human,
material, or financial loss, and is therefore of no concern.
It follows, that the success of any mitigation scheme must
be measured not by the number of objects, but by the
number of potential collisions. While these two metrics
are closely related, they are not necessarily
interchangeable.
To organize the potential mitigation schemes available,
we have chosen to focus on four general categories of
technical solutions: Knowledge, Avoidance, Prevention,
and Elimination. This categorization is described in
further detail below, and potential examples of each
category are provided.

Assume the CubeSat and FCM model launch activity is
in a steady state condition and that the CubeSats all
follow the 25-year rule while the FCMs follow a 5-year
rule. This means that if 1722 CubeSats are launched each
year, then 1722 other CubeSats are re-entering. Similarly,
if 800 FCM satellites are launched each year, then 800
are re-entering. Unless the re-entering CubeSat/FCM
satellites are under control at the time of re-entry, then
the burden of avoiding the objects lies with the ISS. If
~400 currently re-entering objects per year causes
approximately two DAMs per year, then 2522 additional
re-entering objects will likely cause approximately 12
more DAMs for the ISS per year. A too-high number of
DAMs has the potential to adversely affect both human
mission operations and place crew at elevated risk.

Brown

Knowledge
The Knowledge problem, often referred to as tracking, is
a subset of the much broader domain of Situational Space
Awareness (SAA), and is well understood. Namely, how
accurately does the space operator community know the
location of all space objects regardless of size,
provenance, and operational status? In and of itself
knowledge does not have any impact on the collision
potentials. Rather it is an enabler for Avoidance and
Elimination solutions that will be discussed later.
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Impact of Tracking Accuracy

30
both/GP

Improving tracking accuracy is often proposed as a way
of helping with the collision problem. While this is
effective in reducing the number of alerts to which an
operator must respond, it can only help reduce collisions
involving actively controlled satellites. Consider for
example a smallsat under active control, and assume that
any other tracked object that comes within the combined
uncertainty ellipse is a “threat” that either must be
avoided or additional resources must be spent to further
analyze the conjunction to determine that it is not a
danger. Note that the actual threshold that is chosen
during operations to flag an alert is highly dependent
upon orbit accuracy, acceptable analyst workload, etc.
However, for discussion purposes here, it is simpler to
exhibit the point by assuming violation of the uncertainty
ellipsoid generates an actionable alert.

number/of/alerts/per/year/

25

GP/+/ideal
20

both/SP

15
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1600

altitude//(km)/

Figure 4: Effect of improved tracking accuracy on
number of alerts for current (year 0) environment

Furthermore, assume the smallsat and secondary object
are tracked with either accuracy associated with the
SGP4 two-line element sets (GP)9, accuracy associated
with the Special Perturbations methods (SP), or ideal
high precision knowledge. GP would represent using
public catalog data for the object in question, SP would
represent gaining additional dedicated tracking on the
object (and is here assumed to be 3 times better than GP),
and ideal could represent GPS or some type of
transponder (which is here assumed to be 3 times better
than SP). The number of alerts can be computed as a
function of the spatial density (i.e., altitude) and is shown
in Figure 4.

Improving the tracking accuracy can also help reduce the
cost of maneuvering in case that becomes necessary. To
avoid a dangerous conjunction, the active object must not
only move enough to physically miss the other object, but
given the uncertainties, move such that the two
uncertainty ellipsoids no longer touch (to the chosen
sigma level). Larger uncertainties require both a greater
number of maneuvers and a higher delta-V for each
maneuver. In the sample case discussed here, the GP+GP
conjunction solution would require approximately 300
m/s/year of delta-V to alleviate, the GP+SP would need
~112 m/s/year, while the GP+ideal would require ~86
m/s/year. By contrast, only ~11 m/s/year would be
needed if both objects were being tracked to the SP level.

It is immediately apparent that there is improvement to
be gained in the number of alerts by improving the
tracking. At ~800 km and if both objects are being
tracked with GP level accuracy, then the expectation
would be to have ~25 alerts per year. If one of the objects
gained improved SP tracking, then the number of alerts
would lower to ~14 per year. However, there is a limit to
the benefit because the secondary object still has a large
uncertainty; if the primary object is tracked ideally, then
the number of alerts is still ~13 per year. This situation of
diminishing returns could often be the case as most
conjunctions are going to occur with debris which may
be small and poorly tracked under the best of conditions.
If both objects gained SP accuracy, then the improvement
becomes more significant. This is a key point: simply
improving one object’s accuracy (i.e., the operational
smallsat) will only yield a certain level of improvement;
improving the accuracy of both objects’ orbit is essential
to significantly lowering the number of alerts.

Brown

GP/+/SP

It is important to acknowledge that improved tracking
accuracy reduces potential workload on organizations
and their personnel responsible for space traffic safety.
This has not only a cost impact but also a safety impact
by reducing cognitive burdens and allowing focus to be
maintained on true high risk situations. Additionally,
added tracking accuracy adds to transparency of
operations and in effect promotes national security and
international stability in the space domain.
Onboard Solutions
Improving the tracking accuracy of active objects is
relatively easy through modern onboard equipment such
as GPS. GPS receivers for satellites are broadly
available. In Figure 4, this further brings us into the
“ideal” domain; namely the accuracy is high enough to
be statistically equivalent to perfect knowledge for
purposes of determining collision probabilities. This is
especially true when the raw GPS position and velocity
solution is combined with filtering methods such as least6
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The first problem is of primary importance to the smallsat
community. Today, the primary source of published
tracking data is derived from the work done by the U.S.
Space Surveillance Network (SSN), part of the United
States Strategic Command (USSTRATCOM). Tracking
solutions obtained by the SSN are published by the
JSpOC through web-based interfaces. These solutions
are sometimes referred to as “NORAD two-line element
sets”. While the exact performance limits of the SSN are
not publically available, the traditional rule of thumb has
been that a 10 cm (softball-sized) object can be easily
tracked at LEO and a 30 cm (basketball-sized) object can
be tracked at GEO. One can quickly see that these
dimensions are comparable to smallsat dimensions,
especially CubeSats and the newer batch of sub-CubeSat
spacecraft (Pocketsats, femptosats, Chipsats, etc.). The
tracking problem is further exasperated by the standard
form factor that has led to the CubeSat’s success – to a
first order, all of the satellites following the standard look
the same.

squares or Kalman filters. In these instances, position
accuracy can be improved to single-digit meters on a
continuing basis, with no growth in errors due to
propagation.
The advantage of onboard solutions cannot be
understated. The 2013 launch of the ORS-3 mission
onboard a Minotaur I included a record number (at that
time) of secondary payloads, most of them CubeSats.
Approximately half of them, mostly of government of
commercial origin, had onboard GPS. The other half,
mostly of university origin did not. Working with the
individual satellite owners, the Joint Space Operations
Center (JSpOC) was able to identify and tag GPS-bearing
satellites within one week after launch. On the other
hand, for those satellites that did not have GPS or were
inoperative after launch, tagging took as long as two
months. That does not necessarily mean that the JSpOC
did not have TLE-level tracking information for these
satellites, but rather that it was not confident enough on
which solution applied to each satellite.
This
metaphorical “fog of war” is common in launches with
high number of satellite payloads, of which there has
been an increasing number.

A number of potential technical solutions exists to help
improve the tracking accuracy for small satellites. For
instance, in 2006 a set of post-launch guidelines were
suggested by members of the Space Analysis branch of
the Air Force Space Command that would significantly
improve the tracking ease during the initial object
identification period. These included:

Unfortunately, GPS solutions are often out of reach for
smallsat manufacturers due to size, cost, or technical
complexity. For many universities and developing
country manufacturers, GPS units are prohibitively
expensive and difficult to implement. For CubeSats,
especially those utilizing the 1U form factor, addition of
a GPS unit is also not feasible due to mass and volume
constraints.
Developing cost-effective technical
solutions such as incorporating a low-cost GPS receiver
directly on the on board computer or primary telemetry
and command radio could increase the number of
satellites utilizing GPS.

1.
2.

3.
4.

As we previously discussed, however, onboard GPS is
only beneficial as long as the satellite is operational and
its operator is able to share its data or use it internally for
its own COLA assessments.

5.
6.

Tracking Enhancements
For the thousands of resident space objects that do not
have GPS or are not actively controlled, we must rely on
ground and space-based tracking. Space object tracking
faces two major challenges, both of which reduce the
accuracy of publicly available solutions. First existing
assets are limited in the size of objects that can be
tracked; second even when an object can be effectively
tracked, limited resources mean that tracking may be
infrequent.
Brown

Coordinate launch trajectory and initial orbit
information.
For multi-satellite launches information
regarding deployment sequence, separation
timing, and object shape and size is extremely
beneficial.
Sequential satellite deployments should be
separated by at least 20 seconds.
Separation velocity between the satellite and
the launch vehicle should be at least 5
meters/second or more.
Report problems identified in two-line
element sets.
Notify tracking authorities if assistance is
desired with issues regarding satellite
anomalies and/or loss of contact. 10

Refinement and addition to these recommendations has
since been made and incorporated in the JSpOC
Recommendations for Optimal CubeSat Operations
publication10. Additional techniques have also been
proposed that enhance the ability of the SSN to track
smallsats. Some, like transponder-based tracking, in
which the target satellite receives a RADAR signal and
retransmits an amplified return, have the same
disadvantages of GPS in that they require power, mass,
and more importantly an active satellite.
Other
7

31st Annual AIAA/USU
Conference on Small Satellites

SSC17-XI-02
the potential to yield significant improvements in
positional knowledge. In Figure 4, these allow us to
move from the GP domain to the SP domain.

techniques involve increasing the RADAR cross-section
of the vehicle through coatings, geometry,
retroreflectors, and other features. These methods could
be further enhanced if a unique RADAR return-signature
can be generated by the satellite. Similar features can be
utilized to support optical tracking in addition to RADAR
tracking. Such passive techniques have the advantage of
being very low mass and complexity as well as not
requiring an active satellite. Increasing the RADAR
cross-section will be critical for some of the newest
satellites such as Chipsats, especially if they have
mission life times of more than a month or so. A third
potential option is a hybrid “tag” similar to those found
in toll collection systems such as EZ-Pass. In this
scenario the satellite may produce some active response
to being queried by the tracking stations. However the
tag would be an independent, low-power circuit,
completely isolated from the primary spacecraft. This
way, the tag can continue to operate even in the event of
a failure.

For instance Levitt and Marshall set out to study
alternatives to the TLE/SGP4 accuracy with the goal of
increasing “the predictive accuracy for orbital objects,
using only historical TLE data, such that it enables
operational conjunction assessment for collision
avoidance.” In their results, they postulate that use of a
batch least-squares differential correction on publically
available TLEs could reduce propagation errors to an
average of 150 m/day compared to 1,500 m/day. A
roughly ten-fold increase in accuracy13. A number of
other similar enhanced techniques have been proposed
over the last two decades. The exact implementation is
not as important as broader adoption of such techniques.
Data Dissemination
Improved accuracy of tracking solutions are only as good
as their availability. Even when an improved solution
exists, it is often of limited distribution due to proprietary
and commercial constraints.

It is worth noting that smallsats can also contribute to the
state-of-the-art for tracking capabilities. As an example,
two university satellites developed under the auspices of
the AFRL University Nanosat Program were developed
with just this mission in mind. The Oculus, developed by
Michigan Tech aims to improve determination of
spacecraft attitude using unresolved ground imagery.
Ho’oponopono from the University of Hawaii was
designed to provide a calibration and known tracking
target to RADAR stations in the SSN.

Due to the use of previously discussed GPS and ranging
systems, operators of many active satellites often have
tracking knowledge for their own spacecraft that is
significantly superior to what is publically available.
This data, however, is often not made public due to
proprietary concerns. A sharing framework for smallsat
and especially CubeSat enhanced tracking data has the
potential to improve overall community awareness
leading to lower costs of COLA and reduced risk of
collisions. However, even perfect sharing of this data is
still only limited to active satellites.

The second tracking problem is one of frequency. With
limited ground resources available, it is not possible to
continuously track the thousands of monitored objects.
This problem, of course, affects not just smallsats but the
entire satellite community.
The United States
government is actively trying to expand the SSN
resources with new programs such as Space Fence. More
recently, commercial entities have started to step in to
augment the services provided by the SSN. AGI’s
Commercial Space Operations Center (ComSpOC)
utilizes a commercial network of optical and RADAR
tracking stations to provide a catalog that is “on par” with
the JSpOC’s. 12 As smallsat developers find ways to
improve their satellite’s trackability, working with these
commercial providers will be key.

For inactive debris objects, commercial entities with
enhanced catalogs such as the ComSpOC currently
requires a subscription. These commercial services can
be of significant benefit to large operators in assessing
collision risks, but smallsat owners with limited
resources may not be able to utilize these services. On
the other hand it is likely that such small operators will
have satellites with limited or no maneuverability so that
this enhanced data would be of no benefit, even if freely
available.
For both operator and catalog providers the question
exists on whether there should be certain best practices
and guidelines that would encourage free and public
release of data in specific circumstances such as
imminent collisions.

Propagation
Although TLEs are the lingua franca for disseminating
tracking information on objects, we have already seen
they have significant uncertainties, especially when
propagated with the standard SGP4 propagator.
Alternatives to the TLE standard, or even broader
adoption of enhanced techniques in the use of TLEs, have
Brown
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Avoidance

4
LEO,‐non<compliant
number‐of‐collisions‐per‐year

When sufficiently good tracking data exists, it becomes
possible for a spacecraft to perform collision avoidance
maneuvers (COLAs) in order to reduce the probability of
impact against another object. Provided the owner’s
spacecraft has propulsive capabilities, its orbit can be
changed to protect against impending collisions. As
previously discussed, however, this is a balancing act.
High uncertainty in monitored objects can lead to a large
number of false alarms that precipitate an unnecessary
maneuver. Unfortunately most smallsats may not have
the required propulsive capability, and even when they
do, they may not have sufficient delta-V capacity to
perform a large number of COLAs.

collisions‐within‐first‐25‐years
3

collisions‐within‐first‐3‐years

2

1

0
0

The ability to perform COLAs can also reduce the
number of collisions that might occur but its
effectiveness in limiting the long-term growth in debris
is limited. Consider the LEO non-compliant number of
collisions from Figure 2 and reproduced in Figure 5. This
assumes natural decay for however long it takes for decay
to occur. If COLA is performed during mission
operations, then a certain number of the collisions
depicted in Figure 5 will not happen. The 3-year curve in
Figure 5 shows the number of collisions occurring in the
simulation during the first 3 years of a CubeSat’s
lifetime; the number of collisions in this case is much
lower than the no-COLA case. For comparison purposes,
a 25-year curve is shown as well (i.e., a CubeSat
somehow performed COLA during the first 25 years it
was in orbit). What this figure depicts is that most of the
collisions are occurring for CubeSats that have been aloft
for a very long time, decades or more.

100

150

200

years‐from‐epoch
Figure 5: Effect of COLA on LEO, non-compliant
CubeSat collisions

Prevention
Today, the primary means of collision prevention in the
smallsat community is through the use of the 25-year rule
set out in the ODMSP. Broadly summarized, this rule
dictates that any satellite in LEO should re-enter the
earth’s atmosphere within 25 years after it ceases
operations. Depending on the spacecraft’s ballistic
coefficient and solar activity, this effectively places a cap
on a satellites End of Life (EOL) altitude between 550
km and 650 km.
Meeting this goal presents several significant challenges
to smallsat designers:

Logically, this follows: since most objects on orbit now
and in the future will be inactive, it is more likely that the
future debris environment will increase because of deadon-dead collisions rather than active-on-active or even
active-on-dead collisions. This does not mean that COLA
is not useful for protecting an operator’s vehicle from
either having a mission ending event or from liability in
case of hitting someone else; it simply means that COLA
as a mechanism for reducing long-term debris growth is
minimal.
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Smallsats, on average, tend to be more densely
packed than their larger counterparts and
therefore have a higher ballistic coefficient.
This puts the “25 year” altitude threshold lower
than for larger satellites.
Smallsats are usually launched as secondary
payloads, and therefore have a limited choice of
potential orbits.
When placed above the 25-year altitude, the
satellite must have a means to deorbit itself,
which adds mass and complexity and is often
unfeasible to implement in a smallsat.
The satellite must remain operational and under
ground control long enough to execute any
orbit-lowering maneuvers. This can present a
challenge for smallsats which are often meant to
have lower reliability than their larger
counterparts.
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drag while also creating some amount of propulsion
capability utilizing photonic energy from impinging sun
light.

To move a satellite to an appropriate disposal orbit a
number of techniques have been proposed. Most
common is the use of a propulsion capability to lower or
raise the orbit as required. Propulsive techniques have
the advantage of using well known hardware and are
available in any orbital regime, LEO, MEO, GEO, or
HEO. If a satellite already requires propulsion to
complete its primary mission, then adding additional
delta-V capability for disposal is relatively trivial as long
as mass is available. However, for satellites that do not
already include propulsive capabilities, the addition of
such hardware can significantly complicate the design as
well as the approval process when launching as a
secondary. For this reason a number of non-propulsive
deorbit techniques have been proposed through the years.
While these eliminate the inherent costs and risks
associated with propulsion systems, they have the
disadvantage of only working within the LEO
environment.
Non-propulsive techniques in general
work
by
increasing
spacecraft
aerodynamic,
electromagnetic, or photonic drag forces.

It is interesting to note that although many of these
deorbit techniques were proposed over 10 years ago,
none are widely used today. The reason for this is not
clear. It could be due to inherent immaturity of the
technologies (since they first have to be flight tested),
higher than expected implementation costs, or lack of a
perceived need. If there is to be a reduction in the “noncompliant CubeSat population” or if stricter guidelines
than the 25 year limit are to be implemented, it would be
important to understand why such deorbit systems have
not been utilized.
An aspect that is not often considered in developing such
deorbit techniques is that they must, by definition, work
at the end of the mission, when often times the satellite
may be crippled or suffer from reduced capabilities such
as available power. Furthermore, utilizing such devices
assumes that the spacecraft is operational to begin with
and has not suffered a mission-ending anomaly. To be
effective, then, deorbit systems must have an increased
reliability that ensures they will properly operate at EOL,
perhaps even autonomously.
This might involve
selective redundancy, independent systems, and other
fail-saves. For instance, a deployable drag system might
be setup to utilize an independent power supply, and
rather than be deployed using a ground command,
deployment could be based on some sort of watch-dog
timer that is pinged by the main flight computer. Were
contact to be lost with the spacecraft due to a computer
issue or a short in the power subsystem, the independent
deployment circuitry would kick in, deploying the drag
device even as the spacecraft is otherwise defunct.

All methods of increasing aerodynamic drag utilize some
sort of deployable that significantly increases the crosssectional area thereby decreasing the ballistic coefficient
of the spacecraft. These devices can be large sails,
booms, or spheres. One such example is Towed
Rigidized Inflatable Structure (TRIS) proposed by Ball
Aerospace and L’Garde Inc. in 2004. As way of
comparison it was estimated that for a 300 kg spacecraft
at 700 km a 15-m deorbit device would provide the same
capability as 16 kg of hydrazine fuel, but at a reduced
mass and cost penalty. Researchers estimated a system
cost approximately 10 times lower for the inflatable than
for a propulsion system, assuming the satellite didn’t
otherwise have a propulsion system. 14

While disposal guidelines are fairly well understood, if
not always followed, by smallsat designers and operators,
there are other aspects of prevention that are not as
widely implemented. Of particular importance is the
concept of “passivation.” Not only is it important that
the spacecraft be moved to an appropriate disposal orbit,
it is key that during its time in that orbit (up to 25 years
in LEO, infinite in GEO) the spacecraft does nothing to
contribute to the debris environment. The process of
passivation is removing as much stored energy that could
lead to catastrophic breakup of the spacecraft. Such
passivation techniques include depressurizing all
pressure vessels such as propellant tanks, discharging
batteries, and removing all kinetic energy stored in
reaction or momentum wheels. Until fairly recently
smallsats did not often have pressure vessels or
momentum storage devices. However as the complexity
of these satellites has evolved, these features are now

Electromagnetic drag devices utilize a conductive
material, usually in the form of a tether that is set up to
carry a current that is generated by the interaction of the
tether with the magnetic field and ionosphere of the
Earth. The current in turn interacts back with the
magnetic field setting up a drag force that can be utilized
to change the altitude of the spacecraft.
An example of a tether device, the nanoTerminator™
was specifically designed to be used on 1-10 kg satellites.
The nanoTerminator included redundancy features to
increase the probability of survival during the deorbit
phase. The developers estimated that such a device could
potentially increase the permissible orbit altitude of the
spacecraft up to 1000 km while only adding 100g to the
mass of the host spacecraft.15
Other techniques that have been proposed include
utilizing solar sails that can serve to increase atmospheric
Brown
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more prevalent, and passivation techniques must be
adhered to at EOL.

1.E+02

Elimination

1.E+01
P$S*index

An additional method for reducing the growth of debris
related to smallsat is through Elimination utilizing active
debris removal (ADR) systems. The difficulty with any
ADR systems is that the space community has no crystal
ball to know which specific objects are truly going to
collide, and therefore removal targets must be selected
based on their statistical likelihood of adding debris to the
environment. One parameter commonly utilized to
evaluate ADR targets is the probability-severity (P-S)
metric16, which is a combined value consisting of the
likelihood that the object will be hit (i.e., probability of
collision) times the amount of debris that a collision
involving that object would create. In specific terms, the
probability of collision is the background flux that the
object faces times its cross-sectional area while the
amount of debris is a function of the expected relative
velocity and the object’s mass (i.e., the energy of
collision). The P-S value for each object in the simulation
can be computed and a ranking established determining
what the “best” targets to remove are.

1.E$01
1.E$02

Figure 6: Relative effectiveness of potential ADR
targets
Although ADR of very large objects such as ENVISAT
is clearly beyond the domain of smallsats, smallsats may
still be able to play a role in removing extremely small
objects, especially objects that cannot be effectively
tracked such as collision fragments, and separation and
deployment debris. One such concept is a deployable
Multi-Layer Sphere (MLS) that would focus on
purposely breaking up 1-10 cm class debris into <1 cm
debris particles that can be shielded against 17. Other
potential solutions have been proposed including scoops
filled with absorbing gels that would “clean” a path in the
sky. For all of these solutions, further study is required
to assess their capture/removal effectiveness and ensure
that they are not exasperating rather than decreasing the
collision risk problem. Methodologies need to be
developed that can help determine whether these
methods actually decrease the probabilities of collisions,
given the low P-S of the small objects that would be
targeted.

Figure 6 shows the P-S value of potential ADR targets
that could be targeted by a mitigation system. In the
simulation, every object had its P-S value computed; the
objects in Figure 6 are those that yielded the highest
values. ENVISAT, ALOS, and ADEOS are Earth
observing satellites with large buses, solar panels, and, in
the case of ENVISAT and ALOS, large extended
synthetic aperture radar antennas. The SL-16 rocket
bodies (of which there are many) are approximately 11
meters in length and have a mass of ~8300 kg. They are
depicted in Figure 6 alongside a Dove-like 3U CubeSat
in lower LEO (500-1000 km), and FCM 1 and FCM 2
satellites. Note the orders-of-magnitude difference on the
y-axis scale. Therefore, it would roughly require 100-200
CubeSats (or ~500 FCM 1s or ~800 FCM 2s) to be
removed to get the same benefit from removing the
singular satellite ENVISAT. While it may be technically
easier to design a system that can scoop up a smallsat, the
system would also have to be able to move between
multiple targets to influence the long-term growth of
debris.

Brown
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POLICY AND RULES RELATED RISK
MITIGATION APPROACHES
Awareness and analysis of small satellite space traffic
safety risk are necessary steps that must be taken to
mitigate the likelihood of on-orbit collision and orbital
debris generation. Awareness ensures the smallsat
community is cognizant of growing risk – both real and
perceived. Analysis, like that presented here, provides a
rational approach to quantifying the seriousness of the
safety problem both now and in the future. In addition,
analysis must be done to understand the costs and value
of a variety of technical mitigation approaches, many of
which were discussed in the previous section.
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(i.e. cannot be enforced as though they were law). An
example is the United States National Space Policy.

Awareness and analysis alone are not sufficient to have a
significant impact on enhanced smallsat space traffic
safety. There must be an element of management for
such an effort, to include the development and
implementation of policies, processes, and procedures
that are embraced (by either requirement or consensus)
by the smallsat community in order for safety practices
to be truly effective. There exist a wide variety of policy
related courses of action that can be taken to mitigate
smallsat related space traffic safety risks. Such policy
type approaches are manifest in “rules of the road” and
engineering related specifications to be followed by
smallsat developers and operators. Before discussing
what such rules and specifications could be, it is
important to note there are a variety of ways in which
such rules and specifications are developed,
implemented, and enforced. There is often much
confusion in this arena, with a lack of consistent welldefined terminology leading to misunderstandings of
intent and actual implementation process. We therefore
begin with a model of rules development presented in the
SAIC Orbital Traffic Management Report2. This policy
domain “stack” provides a hierarchical depiction of the
range of possible rules-based control mechanisms. This
stack is shown in Figure 7. Going up from the bottom of
the stack, compliance requirements become more
stringent and the bodies creating the rules more formal.
Lower level elements of the stack are typically
subordinate to higher levels.

Laws, Rules, and Regulations
Laws, rules, and regulations are specific directives
created to accomplish policy established by public
entities (governments). These are literally the law or
carry the force of the law. Assumed to be included in this
subset are self-executing international treaties (i.e. do not
require further legislation to be implemented and
followed by a nation-state). An example law is Title 10
U.S. Code 2274 (USSTRATCOM SSA Data Sharing
Program). An example of regulations are 47, CFR Parts
5, 25, and 97, which are used by the Federal
Communications Commission to regulate radio
communications from space stations (i.e. satellites).
Standards
Standards are a set of directives created and or adopted
through consensus by a private entity. They are codified
documentation describing requirements, specifications,
or characteristics that can be used consistently to ensure
that materials, products, processes, and services are fit for
their purpose. Standards must be measurable and
verifiable. These are voluntary, but, for example,
“Federal agencies may incorporate standards developed
by non-governmental entities, thereby forming a quasigovernmental regulatory mechanism.”18 An example is
The Consultative Committee for Space Data Systems
(CCSDS) Space Data System Standard for Conjunction
Data Messages (CDM).
Guidelines
Guidelines are a codified set of recommendations or
advice provided by one or more public or private
organizations. These do not carry the force of law and
compliance is voluntary. Examples include Interagency
Space Debris Coordination Committee (IADC) Space
Debris Mitigation Guidelines and JFCC Space, JSpOC
Recommendations for Optimal CubeSat Operations.
Best Practices

Figure 7: The Policy Domain Stack Model

Best practices are a technique or methodology that,
through experience, has proven to reliably lead to a
desired result. These can be written or unwritten.
Promulgation is typically limited and compliance is
voluntary. An examples is the Space Data Association
(SDA) maneuver notification practices for GEO
operators.

The following is a description of each layer, with relevant
examples provided.
Policies
Policies are high-level principles adopted or proposed by
a governing body, typically a nation-state and/or an
intergovernmental organization. Note that such policies
are higher level abstractions and are not legally binding
Brown
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procedural rules based controls mechanisms for space
traffic safety. “Norms of behavior”, which are informal
understandings of what is acceptable to society, include
political, social, psychological and cultural elements and
evolve over long periods of time. Because of the
complex forces involved, “Norms of behavior” are very
difficult to become universally accepted, especially in
short time periods (years). Thus, we do not consider that
“norms of behavior” provide a timely and reliable means
of risk control and therefore do not include them as part
of this discussion. Furthermore, “norms of behavior” are
most often informed and influenced by best practices,
guidelines, etc., and not vice versa. It is often differences
in value propositions which present the greatest
challenge in implementation of “norms of behavior”.
Safety focused best practices, guidelines, and standards
(especially when based on analytically based risk
analyses), provide a common value proposition of
freedom from potential space operational hazards for
international actors and hence are more likely to be
embraced globally.

Congressionally Chartered Non-Profit Organization
Also referred to as “Title 36 Corporations”, these are
private non-profit organizations with a patriotic,
charitable, historical, or educational purpose. “Chartered
corporations listed in Title 36 are not agencies of the
United States, and the charter does not assign the
corporate bodies any governmental attributes. For
instance, the corporation’s debt is not guaranteed,
explicitly or implicitly, by the full faith and credit of the
United States. The attraction of Title 36 status for
national organizations is that it tends to provide an
‘official’ imprimatur to their activities, and to that extent
it may provide them prestige and indirect financial
benefit.”19 A relevant example of a Title 36 Corporation
is The National Council on Radiation Protection and
Measurements (NCRP). NCRP “seeks to formulate and
widely disseminate information, guidance and
recommendations on radiation protection and
measurements which represent the consensus of leading
scientific thinking.”20
The National Academy of
Sciences and the National Academy of Public
Administration are both Title 36 Corporations that later
also became FACAs.

Both explicitly and implicitly noted within the
hierarchical policy and rules model is the role of
governments versus private entities. For clarity, the
range of organization responsible for development of
rules and process is described in more detail, with
membership and authority ranging from fully
governmental to fully private.

Standards Bodies
Standards bodies are private organizations that create
voluntary consensus standards through common
processes that include consideration of a wide variety of
inputs from individuals and industry. Some form of
internal governance is practiced. Relevant examples
include The International Standards Organization (ISO)
and the American Institute of Aeronautics and
Astronautics (AIAA). Note that AIAA also publishes
guidelines
(“Guides”)
and
best
practices
(“Recommended Practice”) that may evolve later into
standards.

Federal Agencies
“The most prominent means by which the federal
government controls the conduct of private entities is
through a congressional delegation of regulatory power
to a federal agency”.18 Such power is then manifest in
development of rules and/or the grant of licenses. Most
often rule-making and licensing are complementary
actions. A relevant example is the granting of a Federal
Communications Commission license for a space station
defined under FCC rules.

Self-Regulatory Organizations (SROs)
SROs are largely private organizations. “Although there
is no formal definition of what constitutes an SRO, these
organizations are generally viewed as private entities
formed by members of an industry in an effort to ‘selfregulate,’ either because traditional governmental
regulation is impractical or because the industry wishes
to deter governmental regulation by demonstrating that
the industry can effectively supervise itself.”18 SRO
activities can include development of standards,
guidelines, and best practices. In addition, SROs can
truly provide oversight functions. A prominent example
is the Institute for Nuclear Power Operations (INPO),
which establishes safety standards and certifications for
the operation of commercial nuclear power plants.
INPO, a not-for-profit organization, was created shortly

Federal Advisory Committee
Typically referred to as a “FACA”, Federal Advisory
Committees are established under The Federal Advisory
Committee Act, Pub.L. 92-463, 6 October 1972. Their
memberships typically consists of both private and public
individuals; the FACA reports to a federal organization,
providing recommendations for future policy and
legislative action. A relevant example is the Commercial
Space
Transportation
Advisory
Committee
(COMSTAC), which provides information, advice, and
recommendations to the FAA administrator within the
Department of Transportation (DOT) on issues regarding
the U.S. commercial space transportation industry.
Brown
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meeting the requirements of a government regulation
does not guarantee safety.”

after the Three Mile Island incident. INPO’s charter was
bolstered by the recommendations of the presidential
commission established after the nuclear incident:

The alternative is a SRO approach that is coherent,
collaborative, and community-wide using a “bottom-up”
processes and based on technically informed,
operationally relevant, and cost effective development of
best practices, guidelines, and potential standards. This
SRO approach would be appropriate, not only to avoid
regulatory burdens, but to take responsible actions to
truly enhance space traffic safety. Furthermore, if
regulatory action is later desired, rules and regulations
can be derived from the informed best practices,
guidelines, and standards that have been developed.
Given the desirable attributes and outcomes of such an
approach, details on a membership, governance
approach, funding (including possible sponsorship), and
initial focus should be of immediate consideration.
Recommendations for the “Smallsat Space-Traffic
Safety Consortium”, or SSSC (pronounced “triple s c”)
are follows:

“…the [Presidential] Commission recognizes that merely
meeting the requirements of a government regulation
does not guarantee safety. Therefore, the industry must
also set and police its own standards of excellence to
ensure the effective management and safe operation of
nuclear power plants …. The industry should establish a
program that specifies appropriate safety standards
including those for management, quality assurance, and
operating procedures and practices, and that conducts
independent evaluations. The recently created Institute of
Nuclear Power Operations, or some similar organization,
may be an appropriate vehicle for establishing and
implementing this program.” 21
Recently the Defense Advanced Research Projects
Agency (DARPA) initiated an effort that is, in part,
inspired by INPO. Referred to as the Consortium for
Execution of Rendezvous and Servicing Operations
(CONFERS), the effort is meant to kick-start a SRO led
by a private entity:

Membership
The membership of SSSC, as consortium, should consist
of international university researchers and industry (to
include start-ups, their funding partners, and government
contractors) partners. Private individuals should also be
included. To avoid any misinterpretation of the nature of
the consortium (i.e. as a SRO), consideration should be
given to the specific nature of the membership of
government employees. These employees bring a rich
set of experience, concerns, lessons learned, and
understanding of smallsat safety problems, so therefore
must participate and collaborate in the SRO.

“Through CONFERS, DARPA aims to establish an
industry/government forum composed of experts from
throughout the space community. Participants would
leverage best practices from government and industry to
research, develop, and publish non-binding, consensusderived technical and safety standards for on-orbit
servicing operations. In doing so, the program would
provide a clear technical basis for definitions and
expectations of responsible behavior in outer space.”22
The rule-making approaches and examples discussed
here provide a good cognitive framework from which to
begin a discussion within the smallsat community and to
answer the question “how do we want to control smallsat
space traffic safety risk from a policy (vice purely
technical materiel solution) perspective?”

Governance
Some governance and structure of the consortium will be
required. An elected board – appropriately representing
the interests of all stakeholder members – should be
created, to include a designated leader. Technical
committees, each focused on a key area of safety concern
or solution space (e.g. “Smallsat SSA”), should be
created. To be most effective, a central sponsor’s
location and facility should be selected as the recognized
“home” of the consortium. One possible approach is for
the consortium to be headquartered at the chair-person’s
own organization. In this respect, the headquarters would
rotate from time to time as leadership is changed.
Another approach would be to create a not-for-profit
entity responsible for consortium governance. Overall,
the governance process and procedures must be codified
in some way through bylaws or articles of incorporation.

A SMALLSAT COMMUNITY OF INTEREST
The control of Smallsat safety can be top-down, from
government regulations. These could prove to be slow to
evolve on one hand. On the other hand, they could be
enacted relatively quickly, especially after a serious
space traffic safety incident involving a small satellite. In
either case, they could prove to be incredibly burdensome
and greatly impact the rapid innovation, informative
experimentation, and business development capabilities
that are the history and future of the smallsat community.
Furthermore, as stated in the presidential commission
report in the aftermath of Three Mile Island, “merely
Brown
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Financing

CONCLUSIONS

Financial sponsorship should be explored for full
consortium effectiveness, especially if the not-for-profit
model is to be utilized. A SDA model, which bases dues
on a per satellite basis could be informative. Such dues
of course should consider the funding limitations of the
satellite owner/operator. The DARPA CONFERS
program, where a government agency provides initial
consortium start-up funds, offers another alternative
model for initial consortium development. At minimum,
safety focused research, motivated by consortium risk
concerns, should continue to have the same funding
opportunities available today from industry internal
research and development and government grant and
contract sources. Regardless of funding possibilities,
financial sponsorship should not become a pre-requisite
for initiation of the consortium.

Domestic and international emphasis is growing to create
mitigation plans and possible management approaches to
limit space traffic safety risk. Smallsats, in particular, are
a particular focus of that concern. Preliminary analyses
have been presented which show that, in particular,
growing CubeSat populations do not significantly add to
collision risk over time relative to future launch models
of other spacecraft into LEO. However, there exists
additional safety risk from CubeSats that do not adhere
to the 25 year IADC guideline. In addition, growing
populations of smallsats placed into orbit above human
spaceflight zones (e.g. the ISS orbit) do add to the total
number of possible orbital conjunctions with crewed
spacecraft. There are a number of technical approaches
to mitigate these smallsat safety risks. These solutions
can be categorized in the areas of Knowledge,
Avoidance, Prevention, and Elimination. All come with
varying degrees of costs and value. Ultimately, to be
most effective, a community-wide approach to raising
awareness, conducting analyses, and management of
smallsat safety should be implemented. Suggested is a
bottoms-up process, to include formal development of a
Self-Regulatory Organization devoted to smallsat space
traffic safety. It is hoped that, at minimum, this paper
serves as a catalyst in the initiation of a more wide-spread
culture of safety within the smallsat community.

Initial Focus
Based on the technical analyses provided in this paper,
the following areas of space traffic safety risk concern
should be often top priority to the SSSC.
1.

2.

Development and/or reiteration of best
practices and guidelines that minimize total
time on-orbit. As shown in our analysis, total
time on orbit is the fundamental driver to the
integrated probability of collision for a small
satellite. This is an issue for spacecraft of all
sizes, but the limited lifetime and
maneuverability of smallsats, especially
CubeSats, amplify this risk.
Development of best practices and guidelines
that minimize probability of collision with a
crewed spacecraft during decay through the
habited orbital zone. Again, this is an issue for
spacecraft of all sizes, but smallsat limitations
amplify risk in this area.

DISCLAIMER
References to specific products, technologies, or services
are provided as examples only and do not constitute an
endorsement by the authors or the author’s organizations.
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